Israel has emerged from its Oct. 27 election facing an uncertain political future at a particularly consequential moment for its national security. With military operations and security threats continuing on multiple fronts, and a renewed confrontation with Iran looming, the election has left the country without a clear governing majority just as its leadership may need to make some of its most consequential strategic decisions.
The final election results gave Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s political bloc 53 seats, compared with 48 for the opposition alliance led by Gadi Eisenkot and a record 19 for the Arab parties. Although Netanyahu emerged ahead of his principal rivals, neither camp secured the 61 seats necessary for a parliamentary majority.
The results are scheduled to be formally presented to President Isaac Herzog on Nov. 4, with the new Knesset convening on Nov. 10. Netanyahu will meanwhile remain prime minister until a successor government takes office.
The military timetable, however, may prove considerably shorter. Washington is considering renewed strikes against Iran following the Nov. 3 U.S. midterm elections, with the Associated Press reporting that U.S. officials have warned regional governments to prepare for possible military action and Iranian retaliation. President Donald Trump has not announced a final decision, telling reporters on Wednesday that “Anything’s possible” when asked about additional strikes.
The central question, therefore, is not simply whether Netanyahu’s outgoing government retains the legal authority to conduct military operations, but whether an increasingly divided political system can provide the strategic direction and political support needed to sustain an ongoing multi-front war.
Dan Diker, president of the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs (JCFA), told JNS that the election had taken place under extraordinary wartime circumstances.
“Israel has never faced an election quite like this. We are in the middle of a multi-front war, confronting threats that could determine the country’s security for decades to come, yet the election has produced no clear government to lead the country through this critical period.”
The open fronts
Iran remains the central strategic concern. Despite extensive American and Israeli strikes against its military and nuclear infrastructure throughout 2025 and 2026, significant questions remain about the country’s nuclear capabilities. On Oct. 27, International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Rafael Grossi told the United Nations Security Council that inspectors remained unable to verify Iran’s previously declared nuclear material, including approximately 440 kilograms of highly enriched uranium.
Diker cautioned that previous strikes had not eliminated the threat.
“Iran has suffered enormous damage, but the regime is still standing. Its military capabilities have been severely weakened, but the threat has not disappeared. We may be approaching another round of confrontation, and Israel cannot afford to mistake a temporary weakening of its enemy for a decisive victory.”
In Lebanon, implementation of the June agreement linking Israeli military withdrawals to Hezbollah’s disarmament and the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces has made limited progress. In Gaza, the October 2025 ceasefire has not eliminated armed confrontations or resolved the territory’s future security arrangements. In Judea and Samaria, the killing of two Israeli soldiers near Hebron on Oct. 23 prompted extensive counterterrorism operations, with the IDF reporting increased terrorist activity throughout the territory.
Regional instability extends further, with renewed Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia threatening aviation, shipping and critical infrastructure across the Arabian Peninsula.
These simultaneous challenges require personnel, intelligence assets, air-defense resources and logistical support, while arrangements in Gaza and Lebanon involve diplomatic negotiations and decisions about long-term security objectives.
Yet operational readiness addresses only part of the challenge. Determining which threats require military action and what political arrangements should follow ultimately requires decisions at the governmental level.
A caretaker government
Israel’s inconclusive election does not leave the country without an operational government. Under Section 30(b) of Basic Law: The Government, the outgoing cabinet continues exercising its functions until a successor takes office. Netanyahu therefore retains executive authority, while the IDF, intelligence agencies and existing national security institutions remain operational.
That continuity extends to major military decisions. Section 40 of the Basic Law requires government authorization to initiate war or a significant military operation highly likely to lead to war, with authority delegable to the designated ministerial committee. The Knesset must be notified, but its advance approval is not generally required.
“A caretaker government has the same authority, has the same powers as a regular government,” Guy Lurie, a research fellow at the Israel Democracy Institute, explained in an interview.
Nevertheless, Israeli legal precedent requires caretaker administrations to exercise greater restraint in discretionary decisions. National security decisions enjoy considerably greater latitude.
“In general, security issues are the clearest exception to this duty of restraint,” Or Asher, a researcher at the Tachlith Institute, noted.
Daniel Ayalon, former deputy foreign minister, former ambassador to the U.S. and chairman of Silver Road Capital financial advisory firm, told JNS that the political impasse would not necessarily compromise Israel’s immediate security.
“I do not see a real breach in Israel’s security. There will be continuous executive authority”
The more immediate political constraint may emerge from the Knesset. The Jewish-led opposition and Arab parties together control 67 seats, potentially allowing them to replace Likud’s Amir Ohana as speaker when the new parliament convenes. This could give them greater influence over parliamentary proceedings, oversight and legislation, including proposals for a state commission of inquiry into the Oct. 7 attacks, although their numerical majority does not constitute an agreed political alliance.
Israel could consequently find its executive branch directing military operations while an opposing parliamentary majority controls significant parts of the legislative agenda. This would not prevent military action but could complicate the political support needed to sustain it.
Should Washington seek Israeli participation in another offensive, Netanyahu could approve it through the existing government or its authorized security cabinet without first securing parliamentary approval.
The political controversy would likely center on the operation’s objectives. Netanyahu has publicly advocated bringing down Iran’s regime, while Eisenkot, despite supporting previous American-Israeli strikes, has questioned the justification for another immediate offensive and rejected the feasibility of achieving regime change through military action.
“Overthrowing the regime in Iran is not an achievable objective. Setting it as a goal in the last operation was a mistake,” Eisenkot warned in an October interview.
Diker noted that any renewed Iranian operation is likely to require a strategic commitment to long-term goals.
“The question is what it means to finish the job against Iran. Are we talking about destroying its nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, dismantling its regional proxies, or bringing down the regime itself? These are different levels of strategic ambition, and Israel and the United States will need a clear understanding of what they are trying to achieve.”
These decisions could become particularly consequential if an initial operation develops into a prolonged confrontation. Decisions about expanding military targets, responding to Iranian retaliation or determining when to end hostilities would fall to an administration whose opponents could simultaneously challenge its judgment through parliamentary oversight and legislative initiatives.
In a message on Saturday night, Eisenkot wrote that “until a new government is formed I will support military operations only when there are direct and immediate threats against Israel that cannot wait until the new government is sworn in,” indicating that long-term initiatives may face legislative pushback.
The political divisions could also complicate coordination with Washington. Diker argued that Trump’s political support for Netanyahu reflected broader strategic calculations.
“Trump’s support for Netanyahu is not simply a personal favor or a political endorsement. It reflects a strategic calculation about American interests and the confrontation with Iran. Washington sees Netanyahu as a partner in completing a campaign that the Trump administration considers vital to its own national security,” Diker explained. “It appears that a broad coalition of conservative Zionist parties led by Netanyahu is important at this critical moment when President Trump has now appeared to internalize the great danger of the Islamic republics’ leadership. That realization extends beyond preventing the Islamic Republic from acquiring nuclear weapons,” he added.
Sustained joint operations would require decisions about military objectives, escalation management and potentially diplomatic arrangements. Political uncertainty could make securing durable Israeli commitments more difficult, even without interrupting existing military coordination.
Nevertheless, the broad consensus among Israel’s principal Jewish political parties on preventing an Iranian nuclear weapon offers an important counterweight. Opposition leaders could support a narrowly defined military operation while continuing to oppose Netanyahu’s government or rejecting a broader campaign aimed at regime change.
Ayalon emphasized the shared assessment of Iran’s nuclear threat across the main political blocs.
“Both see Iran as an existential threat, and both agree that the nuclear capabilities of Iran should be taken out,” he said.
Beyond Iran, unresolved security arrangements in Gaza and Lebanon require decisions about enforcement and Israeli deployments. Implementation of the American-backed Gaza framework remains stalled over Hamas’s disarmament, Israeli withdrawal and an international stabilization force. In Lebanon, progress under the June agreement remains limited.
The budget crisis
A more immediate institutional challenge concerns Israel’s 2027 state budget. The Bank of Israel warned on Oct. 21 that the coming year would likely begin without an approved budget, while the scale of required defense spending remained uncertain.
Under Israel’s Basic Law: The State Economy, failure to approve a budget before Jan. 1 triggers an interim spending mechanism, generally limiting monthly expenditures to one-twelfth of an adjusted previous-year spending framework, subject to statutory exceptions. Existing obligations and essential services receive priority, meaning military operations and routine defense expenditures would continue. However, financing new procurement programs, expanding military capabilities and undertaking additional long-term commitments could become more complicated.
The timetable introduces further political pressure. Ordinarily, the Knesset must approve the annual budget by March 31 or face automatic dissolution. Following elections and the establishment of a new government, however, the law can extend that deadline to 145 days after the government’s formation, whichever is later. A coalition established in early 2027 could consequently have several additional months to pass its budget.
If coalition negotiations collapse entirely, another election could instead prolong caretaker administration and interim spending arrangements.
The Bank of Israel has identified the unsettled 2027 defense budget as a principal source of fiscal uncertainty, with additional military expenditure potentially increasing the deficit. Prolonged political instability could restrict Israel’s flexibility to finance military expansion and replenish capabilities precisely when its continuing regional commitments demand sustained investment.
Political crossroads
Beyond their differences in security policy, the various political arrangements would leave Israel’s next government with very different capacities to make and sustain major strategic commitments.
A broad national unity government involving Likud and major opposition parties could provide the strongest parliamentary foundation for sustained military commitments, defense spending and regional diplomacy. Shared responsibility for major security decisions could also reduce the risk of domestic political confrontation during a military escalation. The political stability would allow for significant and reliable military and diplomatic commitments within a relatively short time frame.
However, formidable political obstacles remain. Eisenkot has categorically rejected serving with Netanyahu, declaring on Oct. 21, “I unequivocally pledge that I will not serve under Netanyahu or in a rotation agreement. Period.” An alternative arrangement involving Likud under different leadership would require equally substantial political concessions.
President Isaac Herzog has urged the parties to reconsider their positions, declaring that “I expect everyone who comes here to come with an open mind.”
A narrower coalition represents another possibility. Netanyahu could attempt to recruit lawmakers from the opposition, while Eisenkot could pursue a minority government dependent on external parliamentary support from the Arab parties. Reports on Friday indicated that United Torah Judaism was also considering possible cooperation with the opposition, although no agreement had been reached.
Either arrangement could restore normal government functions but leave individual parties or lawmakers with considerable leverage over budgets and coalition stability. During a prolonged conflict, disagreements over military objectives or the economic consequences of escalation could threaten the government’s survival.
The third possibility is an extended deadlock culminating in another election. Under Israel’s government-formation procedures, successive coalition attempts could continue for months before triggering another vote.
Such an outcome would leave Netanyahu directing national security policy as caretaker prime minister while political uncertainty extends into at least mid-2027, potentially complicating long-term defense planning and diplomatic commitments.
Israel’s election has placed the country on two competing timetables. The confrontation with Iran and negotiations over Gaza and Lebanon may demand consequential decisions long before Israel’s political parties agree on a new government.
That uncertainty does not necessarily mean military paralysis. The greater danger lies in the longer-term consequences of political fragmentation: securing parliamentary support for sustained military campaigns, allocating the resources they require and establishing durable diplomatic and security arrangements.
Ultimately, Israel’s central challenge is not simply maintaining its ability to conduct military operations, but ensuring that political instability does not undermine its capacity to translate military achievements into lasting strategic gains.
